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Abstract
In this work we analyze the impact of the voting rule on individual 
behavior. We use a sample of individuals naturally motivated by real 
candidates. Then, in our methodology we do not induce preferences. 
Moreover, up to our knowledge, this is the first work in which both 
individual behavior and aggregate results are studied with a relatively 
large sample. We implemented an online simulation during the presi-
dential campaigns for 2010 in Colombia. Voters were asked to submit 
experimental ballots under four different voting rules: plurality rule, 
approval voting, Borda rule and majority rule with runoff elections. 
We compared the observed individual behavior with two benchmarks. 
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The fist one considers sincere voting and the second one instrumental 
behavior. Our results show that under approval voting and Borda rule 
we observe a lower level of sincerity and instrumental behavior in 
comparison to the other two rules. However, both models predict well 
the aggregate outcomes under all the voting rules.
Key words: Voting rules, instrumental strategic voters, sincere voting, 
social choice. 
j e l classification: D71, D72, C9.
Resumen
En este trabajo analizamos la incidencia de la regla de votación sobre 
el comportamiento individual. Empleamos una muestra de individuos 
estimulados naturalmente por candidatos reales; por consiguiente, en 
nuestra metodología las preferencias no son inducidas. Más aún, hasta 
donde sabemos, este es el primer trabajo en el que tanto el compor-
tamiento individual como los resultados agregados son estudiados 
con una muestra relativamente grande. Implementamos una simu-
lación durante las campañas electorales para presidencia de 2010 en 
Colombia. Solicitamos a los votantes depositar balotas experimentales 
con cuatro reglas de votación diferentes: regla de pluralidad, voto apro-
batorio, sistema Borda y regla mayoritaria restringida a dos vueltas. 
Posteriormente comparamos el comportamiento individual observado 
con dos marcos teóricos de referencia. El primero considera votación 
sincera y el segundo considera comportamiento instrumental. Nues-
tros resultados muestran que la votación sincera y el comportamiento 
instrumental son menores con voto aprobatorio y regla Borda que con 
las otras dos reglas. Sin embargo, ambos modelos predicen bien los 
resultados agregados con todas las reglas de votación.
Palabras clave: reglas de votación, votantes instrumentales, votación 
sincera, elección social.
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Introduction
Human beings may adopt different ways to organize their societies and 
may develop different institutions to achieve social outcomes. Every 
society can adopt a variety of organizational systems in which social 
choices can be made by a reduced set of individuals (even by only 
one) or by larger groups. Most societies have adopted democracy as 
a way to make social decisions. Its adoption has been mainly justified 
because it promotes equality among all of its members; theoretically, 
they all have the same power to decide over the set of social outcomes. 
Another argument in favor of democracy was provided by Condorcet 
in his jury theorem: when the number of individuals involved in 
making decisions goes to infinity, the probability of making mistakes 
goes to zero1.
In this document we focus our attention on the social decision making 
process in democracies. If individuals are all equal within a society, 
and if they all participate in the process of choosing an option, an ideal 
social outcome under a democracy should reflect the will of each one 
of its members. However, given that individuals within each society 
are heterogeneous, it seems impossible to aggregate satisfactorily their 
preferences over a set of options in order to choose only one2. For that 
reason, a desirable (second best) outcome is one that at least reflects 
the preferences of the majorities. To this end, democratic societies can 
adopt different institutions, each one having particular properties that 
may help (or may difficult) majorities to achieve their will.
Here, we specifically study one set of democratic institutions: voting 
rules as electoral systems to choose candidates in large elections.
Besides the problem of aggregation, Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite 
(1975) provided negative results about individuals’ incentives to report 
their preferences truthfully. Particularly, in our context, they showed 
that every non-dictatorial electoral system is not strategy-proof, i.e. 
individuals do not necessary vote for their most preferred candidate. 
However, each electoral system might show different abilities to induce 
1  See Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) for a discussion about Condorcet’s theorem.
2  Arrow’s (1952) theorem is constituted as the main result in this line.Voters’ Rationality under Four Electoral Institutions 82
thuthtelling and to achieve outcomes in which individual preferences 
are better represented. To illustrate the importance of this point, let us 
use an example similar to the one provided by Jean-Charles de Borda 
in 17813:
Suppose that in a democratic society there are three types of voters, 
each one characterized by her preferences over three candidates. The 
30% of the population are type A voters, another 30% are type B, and 
the remaining 40% are type C. Voters of types A and B are rightists, but 
they differ in that the former are extremists; and voters of type C are 
leftists. Candidate Blue represents the extreme right party, candidate 
Purple belongs to the moderate right party, and candidate Red belongs 
to the left party. Then, voters of type A are strictly better off when 
candidate Blue wins, but for them it is still fine if candidate Purple 
wins. Similarly, voters of type B are strictly better off when candidate 
Purple wins, but they are still fine if candidate Blue wins. Moreover, 
both types of voters, A and B, are strictly worse off if candidate Red 
wins: in that case, they do not get any satisfaction. In contrast, type C 
voters are strictly better off when candidate Red wins, and they do not 
have any satisfaction when either candidate Blue or Purple wins. To 
sum up, 60% of voters are rightists and 40% are leftists. Now, suppose 
that this distribution of types and their preferences are common knowl-
edge. Suppose as well that in this democracy the three candidates are 
running for a position and the voting rule is pluralism4. If democracy 
works well, any of the two rightist candidates should win the elections 
because they are preferred by the majority. 
Notice, however, that if each voter would reveal truthfully her type 
(i.e. if she would vote for her most preferred candidate), candidate 
Red would win the elections. Nevertheless, individuals of type A 
and B may forecast this result, and, in order to avoid candidate Red’s 
victory, they could coordinate their vote to favor any of the two rightist 
candidates. Given this observation, and considering that coordination 
may be difficult, Jean-Charles de Borda designed a voting rule, the 
Borda count system, that may help avoid the coordination problem 
3  Cited in Myerson and Weber (1993).
4  Under pluralism there is only one round and the winner is the candidate that obtains the high-
est number of votes. If there is a tie, under our example, the winner is chosen randomly.Julián Parada 83
when individuals vote truthfully: when casting her ballot, a voter has 
to rank the competing candidates by allocating a different number 
of points (votes) to each one of them. In our example, a voter must 
allocate in her ballot the three different votes available -zero, one, 
and two- among the three candidates. Therefore, if all voters cast her 
ballots truthfully, there would be a tie between candidates Blue and 
Purple, and, according to our assumption, the winner would be elected 
randomly between these two candidates.
From the example above, let us highlight the fact that concerns us the 
most in this paper: different voting rules may affect individual beha-
vior in different ways. In particular, each voting rule provides specific 
incentives to vote truthfully or not. In this document we seek to answer 
the following question: How is individual behavior affected by voting 
rules? In order to answer this question, we conducted an online simu-
lation during the campaign for the Colombian presidential elections 
that took place in 2010. We asked participants to cast votes for the 
real contesting candidates under four different voting rules: plurality, 
approval voting, Borda rule and majority rule with runoff elections. We 
also asked them to reveal their preferences over the set of candidates. 
With these preferences we built two theoretical (behavioral) bench-
marks for each voting rule and we compared them with the observed 
behavior. The first benchmark, called sincere voting, was constructed 
with ballots that individuals cast if they rank the candidates following 
their preference order5. The second benchmark, instrumental voting, 
relies on Myerson and Weber’s (1993) theory of voting equilibria, and 
was made up of ballots that individuals cast if they vote following an 
optimizing behavior according to our assumptions. Hence, under our 
framework, we were able to determine whether individuals behaved 
sincerely, instrumentally, both, or none. Moreover, we can determine 
which benchmark better predicts the outcome.
Our results show that voters behave more sincerely and instrumentally 
under plurality and majority rules than under approval voting and 
Borda rule. However, both models predict relatively well the aggregate 
outcome observed. This occurs because most of the not sincere and/
or not instrumental ballots are allocated to candidates ordered in the 
5  We provide formal definitions of sincere voting under each voting rule in section II.Voters’ Rationality under Four Electoral Institutions 84
middle of the preferences. This behavior may be attributed to either 
heuristic or strategic behavior.
Previous literature has focused its analysis on either aggregate electoral 
outcomes or individual behavior in small elections, but not on both of 
them with relatively larger samples. Moreover, most of these works 
build on artificial settings. To our knowledge, our work is the first in 
which both the aggregate and individual dimensions are analyzed from 
a large sample of individuals naturally stimulated.
Forsythe, Rietz, Myerson and Weber (1996) ran a laboratory experi-
ment under three voting rules: plurality, approval voting and Borda 
rule. Through a series of elections, their main goal was to study the 
impact of polls on aggregate outcomes. Blais, Laslier, Sauger and Van 
der Straeten (2009) implemented an experiment with four systems 
-plurality approval voting, majority runoff and single transferable vote 
(STV)- in order to evaluate the performance of rational choice theory 
to predict individual behavior. Bassi (2008) studied strategic voting for 
small elections under three systems through a series of experiments: 
Borda rule, approval voting and plurality, and investigates which 
one of these systems is more vulnerable to strategic manipulation by 
voters. Contrary to these works, in our simulation we did not induce 
preferences but we asked individuals to reveal them. Moreover, given 
the nature of our setting we did not implement a series of elections but 
we conducted the simulation once.
The methodology we present here is more close to that of Laeslier 
and Van der Straeten (2008) as they implemented their experiment 
during the 2002 French presidential elections. Despite they used real 
candidates too, their methodology differs from ours in three aspects: 
while we distributed forms through the Internet three weeks before the 
real elections, they ran their experiment in real time and in real space6. 
Second, instead of comparing their results under the four voting rules 
6  Laslier and Van der Straeten (2008) conducted their experiment in two towns, Gy les Nonains 
and Orsay, and they installed experimental voting posts in the vicinity of the official voting 
posts. Though we tried to implement a very similar setting, we did not get authorization 
from the Colombian authorities. For that reason we implemented the experiment through 
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we suggest here, they only considered two of them: approval voting 
and majority runoff. Third, they do not analyze individual behavior.
The document is organized as follows. In the following section we 
describe our simulation. In section II we present and discuss each 
benchmark under each voting rule. In section III, for each individual 
and for each rule, we present the results by comparing the observed 
submitted ballot with the sincere (instrumental) ballot, and we deter-
mine two main issues: 1. What proportion of the observed ballots is 
sincere (instrumental)?; and 2. If the voter did not cast a sincere ballot, 
what did she do? In section IV we compare the theoretical output 
predicted by our models with the output observed in the simulation 
for each voting rule. Finally, we conclude.
I.   The simulation
A.   Environment
The simulation design sought to exploit the natural pre-electoral 
environment in Colombia during May of 2010. The Colombian voting 
rule for Presidency in 2010 was a majority runoff election. While the 
official national presidential election began on May 30th, when the first 
round took place, we implemented the simulation between the 4th and 
the 15th of the same month7. 
There were nine candidates, but the public opinion considered relevant 
only six of them8 Voters focused their attention on the following 
candidates (ordered alphabetically): Antanas Mockus (Candidate A), 
Germán Vargas (Candidate B), Gustavo Petro (Candidate C), Juan 
Manuel Santos (Candidate D), Noemí Sanín (Candidate E) and Rafael 
Pardo (Candidate F).
7  We also conducted a first version of the simulation by mid-April with a pilot group of 20 
participants.
8  For example, the main TV channels transmitted three live debates and only these six can-
didates participated.Voters’ Rationality under Four Electoral Institutions 86
During the time in which we ran the simulation, the two leading candi-
dates, A (Mockus) and D (Santos), competed in a close race during the 
campaign. Figure 1 shows the results of the published polls in Colombia 
during 2010 at a national level. Nevertheless, in the final results Santos 
reached a comfortable victory over Mockus: 46,67% vs. 21,51% in the 
first round, and 69,13% vs. 27,47% in the second round. 
Figure 1.   Results of polls for intention of vote in the first round    
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Candidate E( Sanín) Candidate F( Pardo) Blankv ote
Source: Until May 7, Ipsos-Napoleón Franco, ``La Gran Encuesta 2010, Medición 8’’, Estudio No. 
10-016807-01 (5465), May 7, 2010. From May 8 onwards, Datexco Company S.A. webpage.
B.  Recruitment and treatment
544 subjects participated in the simulation through the Internet and 
there were 455 valid respondents -i.e. 455 individuals out of 544 
reported a complete vector of payoffs (preferences) and casted ballots 
correctly under the four voting rules. We sent a personal message via Julián Parada 87
electronic mail to individuals over 18 years, which is the legal age 
to vote in Colombia9. In the message we asked individuals to volun-
tarily participate in a simulation related to the presidential elections, 
but we did not provide any additional information about the exercise. 
Individuals interested in participating followed a link attached to the 
message which gave them access to a form, where each voting rule 
was briefly but clearly explained. Table 1 presents a brief description 
of the characteristics of the sample considering only valid questioners 
(more statistics are presented in appendix 1). 
Table 1.   General descriptive statistics. Given that individuals provided the 
information voluntarily, some of them preferred to keep secret 
their socioeconomic characteristics. That is why, for instance, we 
do not report 455 observations but we report 442 for age, 444 
for gender, and 426 for economic activity
 Gender basic statistics 
All the sample  Bogota 
Observations  Mean SD  Min - Max 
Observa-
tions 
Mean  SD  Min - Max 
442   26.5   7.97   18 - 74   356   25.96   8.01   18 - 74 
Gender destribution 
All the sample  Bogota 
Frequency  Percent  Cumulate    Frequency  Percent  Cumulate 
Female   201   45.27   45.27     160   45.71   45.71 
Male   243   54.73   100     190   54.29   100 
 Total   444   100       350   100   
Economic activity 
All the sample  Bogota 
Frequency  Percent  Cumulate  Frequency  Percent  Cumulate 
Student   206   48.36   48.36     170   50.15   50.15 
Civil servant   15   3.52   51.88     9   2.65   52.8 
Employee   127   29.81   81.69     103   30.38   83.19 
Independent   63   14.79   96.48     48   14.16   97.35 
Employer   6   1.41   97.89     2   0.59   97.94 
Howsewife   3   0.7   98.59     2   0.59   98.53 
Other   6   1.41   100     5   1.47   100 
 Total   426   100       339   100.0   
 
The form was designed to simulate ballots for the four voting rules: 
plurality rule (PR), approval voting (AV), Borda rule (BR) and majority 
9  Individuals could forward the message if they wished. For that reason we do not report a 
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runoff rule (MR). In the form participants were asked to cast votes 
under each voting rule for the six real candidates, which were listed 
alphabetically to avoid ordering effects on individual behavior [2]. 
Afterwards, subjects were asked to report their preferences over the 
set of options: following the scale used by 93myersonweber, we asked 
them to report a number between 0 and 10 according to the level of 
satisfaction that they would get if candidate i were elected. Therefore, 
our setting relies on the assumption that preferences depend only on 
the electoral outcome. Finally, we asked them to report voluntarily 
their socioeconomic characteristics. The original form (in Spanish) 
can be found in appendix 210.
Notice that in order to exploit the natural environment we did not 
induce individuals’ preferences over the set of six candidates. Further-
more, we did not provide information about other voters’ preferences 
and we allowed individuals to behave according to their real beliefs. 
Later, in section II, we make assumptions on how individuals form 
their beliefs in order to model instrumental behavior.
Even though the form was electronically distributed mainly in three 
cities -Bogota, Cartagena and Cali- we received filled questionnaires 
from other 51 cities. However, 456 observations (80.54%) came from 
Bogota and the rest were almost uniformly distributed among the 
remaining cities. Hence, our sample is not random nor representative 
and it is biased toward candidate A, who was mayor of Bogota11. In 
section II, as we study individual behavior and the bias toward one 
specific outcome is meaningless for the purposes of the study, we 
include all the voters (455) who submitted ballots correctly.
II.  Individual behavior
In order to determine how the voters’ behavior is affected by the voting 
rule, we modeled two behavioral benchmarks that we compared with 
10  The form was built with the application Forms of the software Adobe Acrobat Professional. 
This program allowed us to distribute the form electronically and, once filled, individuals 
clicked on a button to submit it for the software to store it in a single comma-separated 
values (CSV) file.
11  329 individuals reported candidate A as their most preferred candidate.Julián Parada 89
the observed behavior. Now we introduce the foundations of our 
models in order to define each benchmark.
In our setting, individuals are heterogeneous and they differ in their 
preferences. Voters’ preferences are modeled as the payoffs that they 
would obtain under each electoral outcome. We assume that there is 
a space  ⊂ + 





n =, ,  ()  
in  is a vector that contains the payoffs that an individual of type n 
would get if each candidate were elected. Thus, ui
n is the payoff that 
the voter of type n would get if candidate i ∈ were elected, where 
 ={ ,,,,,} ABCDEF is the set of candidates. Following Myerson and 
Weber (1993), we assume that payoffs are integers in the interval 
[0,10].
From the data we collected in the simulation we found 445 types of 
individuals in the reported payoffs. In table 2 we report basic statistics 
for these payoffs.
Table 2.   Descriptive statistics of payoffs
  Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Payoff A   8.45   2.27   0   10 
Payoff B   5.76   2.80   0   10 
Payoff C   4.09   3.13   0   10 
Payoff D   2.91   3.38   0   10 
Payoff E   2.15   2.16   0   10 
Payoff F   4.43   2.46   0   10 
Let Vr
n ⊂ + 
6  be the set of possible ballots that the individual of type n 
may submit under the voting rule r, where rP RA VB RM R =,,,. Then, a 





n =, , ,,  ()  in the set Vr
n contains the number of votes that 
one individual of type n assigns to each candidate under the voting 
rule r when she casts vr
n. For instance, under PR individuals may cast 
only one vote for one candidate, or may cast no votes (case in which 
they cast a blank vote). Consequently, the cardinality of the set VPR
n  
is 7, as all the possible ballots that individual of type n may cast 
are: (1,0,0,0,0,0), (0,1,0,0,0,0), (0,0,1,0,0,0), (0,0,0,1,0,0), (0,0,0,0,1,0), 
(0,0,0,0,0,1), and (0,0,0,0,0,0). Notice, of course, that the set Vr
n is 
identical for all types of individuals, so in order to save notation we 
henceforth drop the index n.Voters’ Rationality under Four Electoral Institutions 90
A.  Sincere voting
In the first benchmark, for each individual and for every voting rule, 
we construct a set VV r
s





s =, , ,,  () , each 
one of them having as elements the number of votes that individual of 
type un assigns to each candidate whenever she votes sincerely. Thus, 
vr
s is a sincere ballot if the number of votes assigned to candidate 
i, vir
s
,  is a sincere vote for all iA F =,,  . For all the voting rules, the 
blank vote, vr
0 =( 0,0,0,0,0,0), is sincere if the voter reports a vector of 
payoffs equal to u
0 =( 0,0,0,0,0,0). We now define sincere ballot for 
each voting rule.
1.   Sincere voting under plurality rule
Under PR individuals are allowed to submit a ballot in which they can 
either cast a vote for only one candidate or cast a blank vote. Therefore, 
a valid ballot under PR is a ballot vPR such that either viP R , =1 for only 
one i, and vjP R , =0 for every  ji ≠  whenever the subject votes for one 
candidate; or viP R , =0 for every i whenever she submits the blank vote. 
The winner of the elections is the candidate that gets the highest score 
in the first and unique round.
Let  =: ={ ,,} iu uu iA F ∈ {} max   be the set of most preferred candi-
dates. A submitted valid ballot is sincere under PR if the only possible 
vote is casted for any of the favorite candidates in , or if the blank vote 
is casted only when the individual is of type u
0. Formally, 
Definition 1 A ballot vV PR
s
PR ∈  is sincere if and only if is valid 
and either 
• vi u iP R
s
i , =1 >0  for one   when  ∈Γ ; or 
• ui = 0. 
 
Therefore, when a voter is indifferent between two or more of her 
most preferred candidates, any valid ballot is sincere whenever she 
allocates the only available vote to any of her top candidates. Moreover, 
when the voter is of type u
0, any valid ballot is sincere because she is 
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2.   Sincere voting under approval voting
Under approval voting, individuals may cast one vote at the most for 
each candidate, and they can vote for as many candidates as they wish. 
The winner of the elections is the candidate who gets the highest score 
in the first and unique round. Then, a valid ballot under AV is such 
that, for all i, viA V , 1 ≤ .
For this voting rule we use two definitions. In both cases we assume 
that a voter casts a vote for a candidate only if the associated payoff 
is higher than certain threshold. In other words, we assume that when 
a payoff reported for a candidate is higher or equal than the threshold, 
the voter perceives the candidate as acceptable; in that case, the voter 
should allocate one vote to her or him. Otherwise, no vote should 
be allocated. Our two definitions are different in the value of the 
threshold.
In the first case, in a sincere ballot a voter must cast one vote for each 
candidate with an associated payoff of at least 6. Otherwise, the voter 
should not approve the candidate12.
The threshold of the second definition is the mean of the reported 
payoffs (4.6322). Given that we use integer numbers, we assume that 
an individual approves a candidate if his or her associated payoff is 
at least 5.
Consequently, when individuals are of type u
0, we assume that they do 
not approve any candidate. Thus, for these individuals we only regard 
as sincere the blank vote. Formally, 
12  This assumption seems arbitrary but can be justified with the following argument. Across 
generations, the Colombian education system has used a cardinal rule to mark students. 
Until 1997, all secondary schools marked their students with grades in the scale from 1 
to 10, and one student would lose a course if she obtained a grade lower than 6. Although 
that system changed, all universities still use a scale ranging from 0 to 5. It is also com-
mon that a student fails a course if her grade is lower than 3. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
assume that the voters in our sample tend to approve a candidate as long as the payoff he 
represents is greater than 5. This is particularly due to the fact that our sample is made up 
mainly by students.Voters’ Rationality under Four Electoral Institutions 92
Definition 2 Let  be the threshold of approval. A ballot 
vV AV
s
AV ∈  is sincere if and only if is valid and 
 • vu iA V
s
i , =1 if  ≥ , and 
 • viA V , =0 otherwise. 
 
As we will see in section III.A, the results for sincere voting under 
approval rule are highly sensitive to the value of . In fact, we also 
used thresholds of one and two standard deviations below and above 
4.6322 and we confirmed this sensitiveness. However, we suspect that 
individual behavior is more determined by our first assumption. For 
that reason we only report results for the two cases above.
3.   Sincere voting under Borda rule
Under BR, individuals have to cast a ballot in which they allocate to 
each candidate either five, four, three, two or zero votes, but they cannot 
allocate the same number of votes to two different candidates. Hence, a 
voter submits a valid ballot under BR when she casts viB R , {0,, 5} ∈   and 
vv iB Rj BR ,, ≠ , or when she cast a blank vote. The winner is the candidate 
with the highest score in the first and only round.
In a sincere ballot under BR the voter allocates the available votes in a 
magnitude consistent with her reported preferences. For instance, a voter 
who presents the following order of preferences: ABCDEF   
must cast the ballot vBR
s =( 5,4,3,2,1,0). If the individual is indifferent 
between two or more candidates, any ballot which respects the order of 
preferences is sincere. Moreover, if a voter reports equal and positive 
payoffs for all candidates, any ballot is sincere (even a blank vote). 
On the contrary, whenever ui >0 and uu ij >  for at least one j, the blank 
vote is insincere. Formally, 
Definition 3 A ballot vV BR
s
BR ∈  is sincere if and only if it is valid and 
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s
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4.   Sincere voting under majority runoff
In MR elections, each voter may cast either only one vote for one 
candidate or a blank vote. The winner of the elections is the candidate 
who gets a score higher than 50%. If there is no winner in the first 
round, the two candidates who obtained the higher scores compete in 
a second round under the same winning rules.
In this case, the rule used to define sincere vote is identical to the one 
used under PR (see definition 1).
B.   Instrumental voting
In this section we build our second benchmark based on Myerson and 
Weber’s (1993) model. Under that setting rational individuals with 
preferences over the set of outcomes maximize their expected utility 
according to their beliefs about others’ preferences, which are derived 
from the perceptions about the pre-electoral polls.
A key assumption of this model is that, for each individual, her vote 
influences her payoff only if it may change the winner of the election. 
In short, when deciding the number of votes to allocate between two 
candidates, a voter perceives that the more votes she allocates to one 
of the candidates the more likely it is that the outcome changes in 
favor of that candidate. Likewise, this perception is proportional to the 
probability of a tie in the first place between the two candidates: the less 
likely it is that the two candidates compete for the first place, the 
less probable it is that the vote influences her payoff. In other words, 
when individuals make their decisions for each pair of candidates, they 
compare the expected changes in their payoffs when they change the 
number of votes that they allocate to one candidate against the other, 
and such changes must be weighted by the probability of a tie between 
them. For an individual of type n this logic is summarized by the utility 
function of submitting the ballot vr under the voting rule r: 
 
Gp vu pv vu u r
n
ij H




where H is the set of all possible pairs ij. Thus, for a given vector of 
probabilities p, a voter decides her vote by choosing a ballot from Vr Voters’ Rationality under Four Electoral Institutions 94
that maximizes equation 1. Notice that the set of maximizing ballots 
is not necessary made up of one element.
According to the above rationale, a keystone to predict individual 
decisions under 93myersonweber model is the knowledge about the 
probabilities of tie in the first place between all pairs of candidates. To 
simplify the problem, the authors assume that this information comes 
from the knowledge about the distribution of types in the electorate. 
More precisely, given that voters are rational, when they observe the 
results (each candidate’s score) of a pre-electoral poll, and assuming 
that they know the distribution of types in the society, they are able 
to infer the probabilities that support the observed scores. This is 
because polls are in fact an equilibrium in which all voters maximize 
their utility.
Technically, for a given score publicly known, the set of all possible 
expected payoffs from all voters that may justify that score, forms a 
system of simultaneous equations where the probabilities of tie are the 
unknowns. The solution to this system provides the set of probabilities 
of tie, which in turn justifies the equilibria observed in the poll.
In our data we have 445 types of individuals. We also have the 
results of the national pre-electoral polls in Colombia during May 
of 2010. However, we do not know the distribution of types that 
justify the observed scores, so we cannot find the probabilities of tie 
from the available information. Even if we neglect the importance 
of our bias in the sample toward candidate A, and if we assume that 
our sample is representative and that from it we can use the observed 
distribution of types, we would end up with a system of around 3100 
equations in the easiest cases (PR and MR) and with around 327600 in 
the case of BR. Moreover, considering that there may be multiple 
equilibria, finding the probabilities of tie relying on this assumption 
would be quite cumbersome.
In order to solve this problem, we propose a functional form for the 
probabilities of tie in the first place13. This function considers the scores 
13  In the literature reviewed, there are no experiments in real large elections. Usually, groups 
of around 20 individuals participate in experimental elections where the distribution of types 
is of common knowledge (Forsythe et al., 1993; Forsythe et al., 1996; Bassi, 2008; Blais et Julián Parada 95
reported in the polls and hence encompasses the beliefs of individuals 
about other voters’ actions14.
Let S be the highest score reported in the polls and dS S ij ij =| | −  the 
distance between the published scores for candidates i and j, where Si 
is the score of candidate i and S j the score of candidate j. The prob-

























The first term of this equation,  1
2
− () dij , captures the voters’ perception 
of a tie between candidates i and j. Notice that the higher the distance 
between their scores, the lower the probability of tie among the two 
candidates. We add convexity in this term to model the intuition that 
the perception of tie becomes even lower for greater distances. The 
second term in equation (2),  Min SS
S
ij , {} , captures how viable is for 
the voter that the candidates compete for the first place. For example, 
if we want to compute the probability of a in the first place between 
candidates A and B, given that candidate B is far away from the first 
score (according to the last published poll), such probability must 
decrease. Thus, the probability of tying in the first place decreases 
with the highest reported score.
al., 2009). Therefore, assumptions about rational behavior for experimental voters becomes 
much simpler than under our environment. For that reason, we did not find previous works 
in which the probabilities of tie were computed according to a setting of large elections.
14  The form distributed to individuals asks in question D.8 whether they saw the results 
of the last poll in the media. From 435 individuals that answered this question, 88. 71% of 
them answered “Yes”. This relatively high percentage gives us a good level of confidence 
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In table 3 we report the probabilities of tie in the first place obtained 
according to the information provided by the last poll published in the 
media on May 22, 2010 (see figure 1)15.
Table 3.   Probabilities of tie in the first place between candidates i and j
pjA ,    
pjB ,    
pjC ,  
pjD ,   
pjE ,   
pjF ,   
pAi ,  
 0.000   0.041   0.072   0.952   0.145   0.026 
pBi ,  
   0.000   0.082   0.040   0.076   0.056 
pCi ,  
     0.000   0.070   0.132   0.054 
pDi ,  
       0.000   0.141   0.026 
pEi ,  
         0.000   0.049 
pFi ,  
           0.000 
  
With this probabilities we computed the set of all possible expected 
payoffs for every ballot in Vr for each voting rule and for each indi-
vidual. Once obtained the whole set of expected payoffs we took the 
ballots that maximize utility and we built the set of optimal ballots 
Vr
* under each system. For instance, under BR, we computed 327600 
expected payoffs (720 for each individual) and we chose among them 
the set of ballots that maximizes all voter’s utility. A ballot belonging 
to this set is called instrumental ballot, which in turn is optimal.
Let us highlight and discuss two implications of our benchmark. First, 
an equilibrium under Myerson and Weber’s (1993) model may be 
multiple: the vector of probabilities in equilibrium may not be unique. 
Therefore, given that we are fixing the probabilities with equation 2, 
we may be analyzing only one potential equilibrium. This must be 
considered when interpreting our results.
Second, the key assumption of this approach is that voters behave 
under each voting rule having in mind the same probabilities of tie. The 
scores published in the polls arise from asking individuals to suppose 
15  We do not report the probabilities used for the second round in MR, but we use the second 
round’s scores obtained from the same poll.Julián Parada 97
they are voting under an MR system, so the perceptions of ties are 
dependent on these scores. However, the way of counting votes differs 
across rules and this affects each candidate’s score. In other words, 
an ideal scenario is one in which we could use a particular vector of 
probabilities for each voting rule. Therefore, the results of instrumental 
behavior presented in the following section must be interpreted having 
this point in mind.
In spite of our limitations, at this point it is of vital importance to recall 
our main objective. We do not want to test the model of Myerson and 
Weber. Instead, in order to evaluate individual behavior, we build a 
benchmark where individuals behave instrumentally (optimizing), 
and the predictions of this benchmark are compared with the observed 
results.
III.  Results for individual behavior
In this section we compare the observed behavior with the theoretical 
behavior under each benchmark. In particular, we count the number 
of submitted ballots that satisfy sincere, instrumental, both or none 
of the theoretical predictions (i.e. we check for each voting rule whether 
the submitted ballot belongs to either Vr
s or Vr
*). Likewise, in the case 
of sincere behavior we try to find out what was the alternative action 
carried out by individuals when they did not cast sincere ballots.
A.   Results for sincere voting
Table 4 compares the level of sincerity observed under each rule. We 
observe that the system in which individuals behave more sincerely 
is PR. On the contrary, behavior under AV is less sincere. The results 
for AV reported in table 4 are those obtained when the threshold level 
() is 6. When we use the second definition of approval voting   =5 ()  
the percentage of sincere ballots decreases to around 25 (116 sincere 
votes). We discuss this issue in detail further on.
In general, the level of sincerity decreases with the number of candi-
dates for which individuals are allowed to cast votes. However, this 
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round under MR. In that scenario, we observe that most individuals 
casted blank votes instead of casting votes for any of the two contesting 
candidates, even when these have a positive associated payoff. We will 
come back to this point by the end of the section.
Table 4.  Sincere voting
  Plurality  Approval  Borda  1st round  2nd round  2nd round  2nd round 
  rule  voting  rule  MR  A vs D  A vs E  D vs E 
Proportion (%) 
Sincere   96.04   39.56   73.63   95.6   97.36   94.73   69.23 
Not sincere   3.96   60.44   26.37   4.4   2.64   5.27   30.77 
Number of votes 
Sincere   437   180   335   435   443   315   431 
Not sincere   18   275   120   20   12   140   24 
 
Now we describe what individuals did when they did not cast sincere 
ballots.
In table 5 we present the alternative choices that voters made when they 
did not show a sincere behavior under PR. We observe that individuals 
who did not vote sincerely, mainly voted for their second preferred 
candidate. We observed this behavior especially when the first preferred 
candidate is candidate B and the second one is candidate A. Then, the 
insincere vote may be associated to the fact that voters perceived B’s 
probability of winning too low, and, in order to avoid a less preferred 
candidate to win, they chose their second best option. Two more voters 
casted a vote for their third and forth option respectively, but in this 
case we suspect that they made a mistake. 
Table 5.   Insincere vote under PR
 Insincere vote 
Number of votes 
Percentage with respect 
 allocated to   to total votes 
2nd preferred   16   3.52 
3rd preferred   1   0.22 
4th preferred   1   0.22 
Total   18   3.96 
 
For both definitions of AV, table 6 shows the number of sincere votes 
casted to each candidate. Notice that here a sincere vote does not imply 
a sincere ballot, and despite the fact that we observe a high level of 
sincerity for each candidate, in table 4 we observe a low level of sincere 
ballots. This is because our definition of sincere ballot is strong and Julián Parada 99
requires every vote to be sincere. By looking in detail to the data, most 
ballots do not satisfy our definitions of sincerity because the votes 
submitted to candidates ordered in the middle of the preference rank 
tend to be insincere. Voters seem to have clear that they must approve 
their favorite candidate and reject their worst option, but when they 
have to allocate their votes to the candidates of the middle they may 
be insincere. This helps explain two issues: first, the lower level of 
sincerity for candidates B, C and F, which are the middle-preferred 
candidates according to our sample (see table 2); and second, the fact 
that our results are highly sensitive to the threshold used. 
Table 6.   Sincere vote under AV
 Approval voting ( = 6) 




Sincere   93.85   80.22   83.3   89.23   93.19   79.34   94.73 
Not sincere   6.15   19.78   16.7   10.77   6.81   20.66   5.27 
Number of votes 
Sincere   427   365   379   406   424   361   431 
Not sincere   28   90   76   49   31   94   24 
Approval voting ( = 5) 
Proportion (%) 
Sincere   91.21   70.99   79.34   86.15   86.37   66.15   94.29 
Not sincere   8.79   29.01   20.66   13.85   13.63   33.85   5.71 
Number of votes 
Sincere   415   323   361   392   393   301   429 
Not sincere   40   132   94   63   62   154   26 
 
 
In order to check the sensitivity to our thresholds, we also used  =4  
and  = 7. We observe that the number of sincere votes increases with 
, but what is more interesting is that the absolute variation in the 
number of insincere votes is higher for the middle-preferred candi-
dates. Top and worst candidates are approved and disapproved in a 
more sincere manner, respectively. This is because they are ranked 
in the extremes of the ordinal preferences, so the number of sincere 
votes allocated to them does not change dramatically when we change 
. However, the amount of sincere votes allocated to candidates in 
the middle is highly affected when  changes. This observation may 
confirm that there is a threshold of acceptance, and perhaps it is not 
common among individuals, but we suspect that its average may take Voters’ Rationality under Four Electoral Institutions 100
values around 5 where the variations are more sharp. We present this 
observations in table 7. 
Table 7.   Total insincere votes to each candidate under AV. Insincere votes 














 =4  
Approve when  ui <4  2  4   2   0   1   3 
Disapprove when  ui ≥ 4   41  162   132   86   88   198 
Total  43  166   134   86   89   201 
 =5 
Approve when  ui <5  3   6   5   0   4   6 
Disapprove when  ui ≥ 5   37  126   89   63   58   148 
Total  40   132   94   63   62   154 
 =6
Approve when  ui <6 6   19   19   4   7   14 
Disapprove when  ui ≥ 6   22  71   57   45   24   80 
Total  28  90   76   49   31   94 
 =7
Approve when  ui <7  15  44   36   8   9   30 
Disapprove when  ui ≥ 7   7  35   20   24   11   41 
Total  22  79   56   32   20   71 
  
A complementary interpretation of tables 6 and 7 is that voters may use 
middle candidates strategically. This is a consequence of the change in the 
manner that votes are counted under this rule, which in turn changes 
the probabilities of tie perceived by the electorate. For instance, when a 
voter observes that her favorite candidate has chances of winning, she 
can disapprove middle candidates insincerely to increase her chances of 
winning. This effect may be reinforced if individuals know that middle 
candidates have a significant level of acceptance among the electorate. 
In other words, if they know that middle candidates may play a role of 
consensus candidates, voters can anticipate others’ actions to realize 
that a high number of approved votes for these candidates may put 
on risk the victory of their most preferred one. This interpretation is 
consistent with the relatively high number of disapprovals for middle 
candidates observed in table 7.
The results presented in table 8 for BR are similar. Each column 
corresponds to the number of individuals that allocated 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 Julián Parada 101
or 5 votes insincerely. Each row shows the candidate’s ranking in the 
preferences from whom the insincere vote was allocated. For example, 
the value in the first cell means that 3 individuals casted 0 votes for 
their most preferred candidate when they instead should have casted 
5 votes to him or her. Similarly, 1 individual gave 0 votes to his or her 
second preferred candidate when he or she should have casted 4 votes. 
14 subjects gave 0 votes to their third preferred candidate when they 
should have casted 3 votes, and so on. Consequently, 63 individuals 
voted insincerely when they allocated the lowest possible number of 
votes (0) under BR. Notice that, similarly to the results presented in 
table 6, these results show sincere votes instead of sincere ballots, so 
one individual might be repeated across columns. 
Table 8.   Insincere vote under BR
  viB R , =0
 
viB R , =1
 
viB R , =2
 
viB R , =3
 
viB R , =4
 
viB R , =5
 
1st preferred   3   1   1   4   20   n.a. 
2nd preferred   1   10   15   43   n.a.   7 
3rd preferred   14   24   33   n.a.   27   0 
4th preferred   22   36   n.a.   24   9   2 
5th preferred   23   n.a.   26   5   3   1 
6th preferred   n.a.   12   4   1   3   1 
Total   63   83   79   77   62   11 
 
In general, we observe a similar pattern to the one observed in the case 
of AV: more sincere votes are allocated to the candidates of the extremes, 
especially to the favorite candidate. By contrast, when individuals allo-
cate votes to the middle candidates, they tend to disregard the order 
of their preferences.
In the case of MR, the results are identical to the results of PR. Then, 
the values presented on table 5 are analogous for this case.
In the second round we observe a high percentage of sincere ballots 
when candidate A is part of the contest. Nevertheless, individuals casted 
a higher number of insincere ballots when D and E were confronted in 
the second round (see table 4). Indeed, they submitted a large number 
of votes in blank. One interpretation that may explain the low level of 
sincerity observed in this scenario is the following: notice that candi-
dates D and E are the less supported by our sample; the average payoff 
reported by D is 2,91 and by E is 2,16 (see table 2). Notice as well that Voters’ Rationality under Four Electoral Institutions 102
the most preferred candidate of the sample is not present anymore. 
This may suggest that negative perceptions about less preferred candi-
dates may increase when preferred candidates leave the contest. In such 
case either of the following two effects may take place: preferences may 
be altered or voters punish the result of the first round.
If preferences got altered, our results are overestimating the number 
of insincere ballots and we should recover again a vector of prefer-
ences with only two candidates. On the other hand, if preferences 
remain unchanged, our results capture the effect of nonconformity 
embodied in the insincere ballots: if the worst candidates beat the best 
ones in the first round, the blank vote may represent a way to show 
nonconformity.
B.  Results for instrumental behavior
Table 9 presents the general results for instrumental behavior. 
















  MR  A vs D  A vs E  D vs E 
Proportion (%) 
Instrumental  82.2  30.55   18.46   81.98   95.16   93.41   34.95 
Non instrumental  17.8  69.45   81.54   18.02   4.84   6.59   65.05 
Number of votes 
Instrumental  374  139   84   373   433   425   159 
Non instrumental  81  316   371   82   22   30   296 
 
Table 9 reveals an interesting fact: If the proposed probabilities are 
consistent with the theory of voting equilibria, then, even if the rational 
model predicts relatively well the outcomes under both AV and BR (see 
table 11 in section IV), it fails to explain individual behavior. Likewise, 
the model explains relatively well individual behavior under PR and 
MR elections in the first round.
This fact is consistent with Blais et al.’s (2009) results: Given that 
under PR and BR individuals are allowed to submit votes for a higher 
number of candidates, a rational behavior might demand from voters 
a more difficult number of computations. In such cases voters can Julián Parada 103
behave in an more heuristic manner in order to avoid such complicated 
calculations (Blais et al., 2009).
In order to summarize the results, the last exercise we performed 
consists on crossing the information to check if the behavior was 
sincere, instrumental, both or none. Table 11 shows the results. 

















  (A vs D)  (A vs E)   (D vs E) 
Sincere and               
instrumental   79.56   19.12   16.48   79.56   95.16   93.41   34.95 
Sincere and               
non instrumental   16.48   20.44   57.14   16.04   2.2   1.32   34.29 
Non sincere and               
instrumental   2.64   11.43   1.98   2.42   0   0   0 
Non sincere and               
non instrumental   1.32   49.01   24.4   1.98   2.64   5.27   30.77 
 
A considerable share of ballots casted under AV and BR corresponds to a 
behavior which is not instrumental nor sincere. When inspecting in detail 
observation by observation, a consistent story with this results arises:
Given the nature of the sample, it is possible that under AV and BR 
an important share of individuals behaved strategically to reduce the 
probability of a tie for first place between their favorite candidate (A) 
and his most threatening competitor (D). Even if other candidates 
have lower associated payoffs than the payoff of candidate D, strategic 
voters allocate a larger number of votes to the former, preferable to 
those with small chances of winning. This occurs in spite of a reduction 
in the expected utility. Therefore, strategic ballots submitted by this 
group are both not sincere because they rank better (or approve more) 
middle candidates regardless of their preferences, and not instrumental 
because with their action they seek to reduce the probability of tie in 
favor of candidate A16.
16  Recall that the main assumption of the instrumental model is that the probability of tie in 
the first place is given. Hence, individuals cast ballots attempting to affect the outcome and 
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IV.   Aggregate outcomes
The results of the electoral outcome when comparing the observed 
data with each benchmark are presented in the table 11. Under each 
column labeled as textit{Sincere and textit{Instrumental we present 
the theoretical results that we could obtain in case that all individuals 
behaved either sincerely or instrumentally.
Under all voting rules, the electoral outcome does not seem to vary 
significantly across both observed data and sincere behavior. Thus, 
aggregate predictions of the sincere benchmark seem more accurate 
than the predictions of the instrumental model, given that the latter 
performs well only under AV and BR.
Not surprisingly, under all the results we observe that candidate A 
(Mockus) wins the elections in our setting. If individuals behaved 
instrumentally, his score would increase in more than 13 points under 
PR and under MR. If subjects behaved sincerely, his score would 
remain around the same level except in the case of AV, where his score 
decreases in more than 5 points. On the other hand, if we focus our 
attention on PR and MR, we observe that candidate B (Vargas) would 
be better off as long as individuals voted sincerely and not instrumen-
tally. In contrast, under the same voting rules, candidate D (Santos) is 
better scored under the instrumental predictions. This is due to the fact 
that he is well positioned in the polls, so the high probability of a tie 
in the first place with other candidates increases the expected utility 
of casting votes in his favor. Indeed, there seems to be a reallocation 
of votes from irrelevant candidates to him.
Results in table 11 are consistent with previous results. Under AV and 
BR, middle-preferred candidates are favored (Myerson and Weber, 1993; 
Forsythe et al., 1993; Forsythe et al., 1996). We observe that candidates 
B, C and F improve their scores under these two voting rules. In partic-
ular, candidate F passes from the fifth position under PR and MR to the 
third position under BR. Candidate C rises from the forth place under 
PR and MR to the third place under AV. And Candidate B, who is placed 
third under PR, rises to the second position under both AV and BR.
On the other hand, candidate E, who is the least preferred candidate in 
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V.  Concluding remarks
In this paper we report the results of a simulation implemented in May 
of 2010, when the presidential elections took place in Colombia. We 
conducted this simulation in order to study individual behavior and 
aggregate outcomes under four different voting rules.
Our two models do not adequately explain individual behavior under 
AV and BR, even when the outcome can be reasonably predicted. In 
the case of sincere voting, individuals vote sincerely mainly for the 
candidates ordered in the extremes of their preferences. However, they 
vote insincerely for the candidates of the middle.
In the case of instrumental voting, this observation might be associated 
with two facts. First, such behavior can reflect a heuristic reasoning 
which arises when the complexity of the voting rule demands difficult 
calculations from voters. Second, voters may behave strategically in 
order to prevent threatening candidates from beating their favorite 
one. In that case, in order to increase their favorite candidate’s prob-
ability of winning, individuals may allocate votes to candidates with 
lower payoffs rather than to the threatening candidate, even when the 
expected utility decreases.
Contrary to AV and BR, instrumental voting predominates among 
voters under PR and MR with runoff elections. However, the rational 
choice theory does not predict well electoral outcomes for these two 
rules.
In general, we observe that our model of sincere voting predicts better 
the aggregate outcome.
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Appendix
1.  Other characteristics of the sample
In this section we present complementary statistics of the socio-
economic characteristics in the sample. Recall that voters answered 
voluntarily to these questions, for that reason the number of answers 
do not necessary coincides with the total number of observations used 
in the study. 
Table 12.   Usage of media to get information about the candidates. The 
question in the form was the following: Mark in a scale from 1 to 
5 your usage of media to get information about the candidates, 
where 1 corresponds to “no use at all” and 5 to “highly used”
 Frequency   Percentage 
 Cumulate 
percentage 
 Frequency   Percentage 
 Cumulate 
percentage 
   Magazines (Semana, Cambio, etc.)   Advertising on streets 
1   97   22.15   22.15   188   44.98   44.98 
2   54   12.33   34.47   108   25.84   70.81 
3   107   24.43   58.9   71   16.99   87.8 
4   87   19.86   78.77   41   9.81   97.61 
5   93   21.23   100   10   2.39   100 
Total   438   100     418   100   
   Newspapers   Internet 
1   39   8.84   8.84   20   4.56   4.56 
2   47   10.66   19.5   26   5.92   10.48 
3   96   21.77   41.27   58   13.21   23.69 
4   130   29.48   70.75   92   20.96   44.65 
5   129   29.25   100   243   55.35   100 
Total   441   100     439   100   
   Radio   Chating with relatives/friends 
1   77   17.74   17.74   11   2.48   2.48 
2   56   12.9   30.65   21   4.74   7.22 
3   86   19.82   50.46   87   19.64   26.86 
4   113   26.04   76.5   173   39.05   65.91 
5   102   23.5   100   151   34.09   100 
Total   434   100     443   100   
   Television   Debates where candidates participated 
1   43   9.79   9.79   35   7.94   7.94 
2   42   9.57   19.36   30   6.8   14.74 
3   82   18.68   38.04   69   15.65   30.39 
4   104   23.69   61.73   136   30.84   61.22 
5   168   38.27   100   171   38.78   100 
Total   439   100     441   100   
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Table 13.  Highest educative level reached
Frequency   Percentage   Cumulate percentage  
Primary 1  0.24  0.24 
Secondary 12  2.86  3.1 
Technician  5  1.19  4.3 
Bachelor 253  60.38  64.68 
Specialist 49  11.69  76.37 
Master 75  17.9  94.27 
Doctoral 24  5.73  100 
Total 419   100   
2.  Questionnaire
Estudio del sistema electoral en Colombia        
Toulouse School of Economics mayo de 2010  
A.   Indicaciones 
Gracias por participar y contribuir en esta simulación. Por favor lea 
cuidadosamente las instrucciones. 
Los resultados de esta actividad serán utilizados estrictamente para 
propósitos científicos y académicos. No solicitamos ninguna infor-
mación que le ponga en riesgo. 
En esta simulación usted no tardará más de 15 minutos. Si desea 
conocer los resultados de nuestro proyecto, al final de la encuesta 
registraremos sus datos para ponernos en contacto con usted poste-
riormente. 
A través de esta actividad buscamos evaluar la sensibilidad de los 
resultados electorales bajo diferentes formas de participación ciuda-
dana empleadas en otras democracias del mundo. 
El éxito del proyecto depende de la seriedad con que usted tome esta 
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En adelante, por favor suponga que las elecciones presidenciales tienen 
lugar hoy. En esta simulación usted votará para elegir al Presidente 
de Colombia (y su respectiva fórmula vicepresidencial) bajo cuatro 
circunstancias diferentes. En cada caso, por favor suponga que el 
Presidente de Colombia será elegido de acuerdo con las reglas espe-
cificadas allí. 
Su voto y el voto de muchos otros ciudadanos colombianos que 
participan de esta simulación son muy importantes para el resultado de 
estas elecciones hipotéticas. Sus preferencias electorales permanecerán 
en secreto y no serán reveladas a nadie por ningún motivo. 
A continuación usted iniciará la simulación. Por favor recuerde que 
su voto ayudará a determinar el resultado electoral. 
Por favor NO utilice el teclado para marcar sus elecciones. 
Utilice el ratón para marcar sus elecciones. Únicamente use el 
teclado cuando sea necesario introducir texto. 
Al finalizar la simulación por favor envíe sus respuestas 
pinchando sobre el botón ENVIAR FORMA (SUBMIT FORM) 
ubicado en la parte superior derecha. Si experimenta problemas 
por favor envíe el formulario diligenciado al correo juliandpb@
gmail.com.   
B.1.   Votación bajo regla de pluralidad 
Por favor vote siguiendo las indicaciones descritas a continuación: 
Bajo la regla de pluralidad usted solo puede votar por un único candi-
dato. El único ganador de las elecciones es el candidato que obtenga 
el mayor número de votos en la primera y única vuelta. Por favor 
marque con una X el recuadro que aparece en frente del candidato 
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Los candidatos aparecen en orden alfabético: 
Antanas Mockus
Germán Vargas Lleras 
Gustavo Petro 
 
Juan Manuel Santos 
Noemí Sanín 
Rafael Pardo 
Voto en blanco 
B.2.   Votación bajo voto aprobatorio 
Por favor vote siguiendo las indicaciones descritas a continuación:
 
Bajo el voto aprobatorio usted puede aprobar (votar por) tantos 
candidatos como usted desee. El único ganador de las elecciones es 
el candidato que obtenga el mayor número de votos en la primera y 
única vuelta. Como se mencionó arriba, usted puede votar por tantos 
candidatos como desee. Por favor marque con una X en frente del (los) 
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Los candidatos aparecen en orden alfabético: 
Antanas Mockus
Germán Vargas Lleras 
Gustavo Petro 
 
Juan Manuel Santos 
Noemí Sanín 
Rafael Pardo 
Voto en blanco 
B.3.   Votación bajo sistema Borda 
Por favor vote siguiendo las indicaciones descritas a continuación:
 
Bajo el sistema de votación Borda, usted debe ordenar los candidatos 
asignando un número diferente de votos a cada uno de ellos. Dado 
que tenemos 6 (seis) candidatos, usted debe asignar entre 0 y 5 votos 
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el mismo número de votos. El único ganador de las elecciones es el 
candidato que obtenga el mayor número de votos en la primera y 
única vuelta. 
Los candidatos aparecen en orden alfabético: 
Antanas Mockus
0 1 2 3 4 5
Germán Vargas Lleras  0 1 2 3 4 5
Gustavo Petro 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5
Juan Manuel Santos  0 1 2 3 4 5
Noemí Sanín  0 1 2 3 4 5
Rafael Pardo  0 1 2 3 4 5
Voto en blanco
B.4.   Votación en dos vueltas 
Por favor vote siguiendo las indicaciones descritas a continuación: Voters’ Rationality under Four Electoral Institutions 114
En este caso usted puede votar solo por un candidato. Si en la primera 
vuelta ningún candidato obtiene más del 50% de los votos, entonces 
los dos candidatos con mayor votación se enfrentan de nuevo en una 
segunda vuelta. El único ganador de las elecciones es el candidato 
que obtenga más del 50% de los votos en alguna de las dos vueltas 
electorales. 
B.4.1.   Votación en primera vuelta
Los candidatos aparecen en orden alfabético: 
Antanas Mockus
Germán Vargas Lleras 
Gustavo Petro 
 
Juan Manuel Santos 
Noemí Sanín 
Rafael Pardo 
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B.4.2.   Votación en segunda vuelta 
En este caso hemos seleccionado a los candidatos con mayor opción 
de pasar a la segunda vuelta de acuerdo con las encuestas nacionales 
sobre intención de voto. 
B.4.2.1. Si en la segunda vuelta se presentaran Antanas Mokus y Juan    
  Manuel Santos, ¿por cuál de ellos usted votaría? 
Antanas Mockus Voto en blanco
Juan Manuel Santos 
B.4.2.2. Si en la segunda vuelta se presentaran Juan Manuel Santos y    
  Noemí Sanín, ¿por cuál de ellos usted votaría? 
Juan Manuel Santos  Voto en blanco
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B.4.2.3. Si en la segunda vuelta se presentaran Antanas Mokus y Noemí 
Sanín, ¿por cuál de ellos usted votaría? No marque ninguno si su voto 
es en blanco. 
Antanas Mockus Voto en blanco
Noemí Sanín 
C.   Preferencias 
Por favor califique de 0 a 10 su grado de satisfacción si determinado 
candidato saliera elegido Presidente, siendo 0 el más bajo grado de 
satisfacción y 10 el más alto. 
Antanas Mockus
Si Mockus fuera Presidente su satisfacción 
sería igual a: 
Germán Vargas Lleras 
Si Vargas Lleras fuera Presidente su 
satisfacción sería igual a: 
Gustavo Petro 
 
Si Petro fuera Presidente su satisfacción sería 
igual a: 
Juan Manuel Santos 
Si Santos fuera Presidente su satisfacción sería 
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Noemí Sanín 
Si Noemí fuera Presidente su satisfacción sería 
igual a: 
Rafael Pardo 
Si Pardo fuera Presidente su satisfacción sería 
igual a: 
D.  Información básica
D.1.  Género:  Femenino   Masculino 
D.2. Edad:
D.3. Municipio o ciudad donde ha pasado la mayor parte de su vida:
D.4. Municipio o ciudad donde actualmente reside:
D.5. Principal actividad económica:
Estudiante  Jornalero o peón
Empleado público Trabajador familiar sin remuneración
Empleado privado Oficios del hogar
Independiente o cuenta propia Otro
Patrón o empleador Especifique
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D.7. Por favor califique de 1 a 5 EL USO QUE USTED HACE de los medios de comunicación 
para informarse acerca de los candidatos, siendo 1 NO HAGO NINGÚN USO y 5 USO 
MUCHO.
Revistas periodísticas (Semana, 
Cambio, Dinero, etc.)
Publicidad en las calles
Otras revistas Internet
Periódico
Conversaciones con amigos y/o 
familiares
Radio
Debates en los que participan los 
candidatos
Televisión
D.8. ¿Vio usted los resultados de la última encuesta sobre intención de voto en Colombia?
Sí No
D.10 ¿Cree usted que los resultados de esa encuesta influyen sobre su decisión de por qué 
candidato votar?
Sí No
La simulación ha terminado 
Si desea mayor información sobre esta actividad por favor comu-
níquese con Julián David Parada (coordinador): 
Correo electrónico: juliandpb@gmail.com 
Teléfono: (+33) 637727018, Toulouse, Francia. 
Si desea conocer los resultados de este estudio por favor escriba su 
nombre y su correo electrónico y más adelante le haremos llegar la 
información: 
Nombre: ______________________________________________
Correo electrónico: ______________________________________